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I. INTRODUCTION
“The financial scars of the longest post-World War II recession
remain etched in many Americans’ everyday lives.”1 “It’s worth the
wait for things. I consider whether I really need or I really want
something,” says Jennifer Butz a 35-year-old woman, who in the
wake of the financial crisis, lost her job, car, house and filed for
bankruptcy - all within a matter of four years.2
The 2008 financial crisis led to the worst recession in
modern day history.3 Almost a decade later, the country and
its people still have not fully recovered.4 A main culprit of the
2008 crash was said to be have been caused by mortgaged
back securities founded on the backs of the American dream
of home ownership.5 This article will explore the implications
of such lending and the resulting regulations, The Volcker
1. See Janna Herron, 4 Personal Stories of the Great Recession, BANKRATE,
(Sept. 27, 2013), www.bankrate.com/personal-finance/smart-money/4-personalstories-of-the-great-recession/ (explaining the ramifications of the 2008
financial crisis “that many Americans … like Butz, still hold on to the costcutting habits that kept them afloat after job losses, foreclosure and
bankruptcy, as they regain financial security. Some are teaching younger
generations these lessons. Still, some have yet to recover”).
2. Id.
3. Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial
Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 41 (2011), www.hblr.org//wpcontent/uploads/sites/18/2014/09/Volcker-Rule.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Id.
945
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Rule - the linchpin of the Dodd Frank Act, which prohibits
predatory lending practices.6 It was the Volcker Rule which
was enacted to combat practices that led to an economic
decline. This article will then further explore the pros and
cons of the Volker Rule and compare its effectiveness to tackle
the looming issues with The Financial Choice Act proposed by
the Trump Administration. Finally, this article will provide
an analysis of a proper solution to the structure and
mechanisms used by lending institutions that best safeguard
against predatory lending.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Financial Crisis
The financial crisis neither looked upon our country
without unheeded warnings, nor was the threat of subprime
lending without warning.7 To understand the ramifications
caused by the mechanisms used by lending institutions, it is
necessary to gain insight into a brief history of predatory
lending and the factors that led to the financial crisis.

B. Poor Judgment on the Part of Financiers
In the fall of 2008, a major global financial service firm
and global bank, Lehman Brothers, collapsed and filed for
bankruptcy.8 With $639 billion in assets and $619 billion in debt,
Lehman's bankruptcy filing was the largest in history.9 Lehman’s
demise made it the largest victim of the U.S. subprime mortgageinduced financial crisis that swept through global financial markets
in 2008.10 A subprime mortgage is a type of mortgage that is
normally issued by a lending institution to borrowers with low
credit ratings.11 Usually, lending institutions will offer borrowers,
who cannot obtain conventional mortgages because of their low
6. Id.
7. Joe Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, and Stephen Labaton, White House
Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2008),
www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/21admin.html.
8. The Origins in the Financial Crisis Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept.
7, 2013) www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financialcrisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article.
9. The collapse of Lehman Brothers: A case study, INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/lehman-brothers-collapse.asp
(last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
10. Id.
11. See Subprime Mortgage, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
subprime_mortgage.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (explaining borrower's lower
credit rating, a conventional mortgage is not offered because the lender views
the borrower as having a larger-than-average risk of defaulting on the loan).
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credit, a charge interest on subprime mortgages at a higher rate
than a conventional mortgage to compensate the lender for carrying
more risk12 Lehman’s collapse is regarded as one of the main
culprits that led to the erosion of nearly $10 trillion in market
capitalization and intensified the countries poor financial
stability.13

C. The Housing Boom and Mortgaged Backed
Securities
In 2007, Lehman underwrote more mortgage-backed securities
than any other firm.14 The firm had accumulating an $85 billion
portfolio in mortgage backed securities—four times its
shareholders' equity.15 A mortgage-backed security (“MBS”) is a
type of asset-backed security that is secured by a mortgage or
collection of mortgages.16 They are created when a number of these
loans, usually with similar characteristics, are pooled together.17 A
classic example of this is when a bank offering home mortgages
rounds up $X million worth of such mortgages.18 Those mortgages,
with good, bad, and ugly creditworthiness, are then pooled in order
to be sold to a federal government agency, or a government
sponsored-enterprise such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or to a
securities firm to be used as the collateral for the new MBS.19
At the core, an MBS allows a bank to move a mortgage off its
books by turning it into a security and selling it to investors.20 This
allows a bank free up capital for more lending.21 With MBSs
receiving AAA standards, investors were more and more
encouraged by the traditional strength of the housing market and
the ratings on MBS, to purchase these securities.22 Eventually,
there was a continuous, steady stream of demand for these

12. Id.
13. See id. (explaining how in the February of 2007, the stock reached a
record $86.18, giving Lehman a market capitalization of close to $60 billion.
However, by the first quarter of 2007, cracks in the U.S. housing market were
already becoming apparent as defaults on subprime mortgages rose to a sevenyear high).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Mortgage Backed Securities, www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersmortgagesecuritieshtm.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See generally, FINRA, Mortgage Backed Securities, www.finra.org/
investors/mortgage-backed-securities (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (explaining
how mortgage-backed securities are bonds secured by home and other real
estate loans).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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repackaged mortgages.23
Eventually, MBS would encourage banks to reach further
down in creditworthiness to supply more to eager investors.24 Thus,
the MBS market started seeing more subprime MBSs. Additionally,
with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae also assertively supporting the
mortgage market, the quality of all mortgage backed securities
declined below their increasingly meaningless ratings.25 When
subprime borrowers began to default, the housing market began to
collapse.26 More and more people defaulted from their mortgages
and the primary assets underpinning the MBS market saw sharp
declines.27
This landslide of non-payments meant that many of the MBS
based off the pools of mortgages were vastly overvalued.28 The
market for MBSs dried up and losses piled up as institutional
investors and banks attempted to unload bad MBS investments.29
This led to many banks being on the brinks of insolvency.30
However, to the rescue came the United States Treasury with a
$700 billion bailout to save these banks from shutting their doors
and causing a global economic meltdown.31 Additionally, the
23. Id.
24. See John J. McConnell & Stephan A. Buser, The Origins and the
Evolution of the Market for Mortgage Backed Securities, ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.
at 17, (Aug. 19, 2011), www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/
mcconnell/publications/The-Origins-and-Evolution-of-the-Market.pdf
(explaining that “[t]he first mortgage-backed security (MBS) was issued in
1968. Thereafter, the MBS market grew rapidly with outstanding issuances
exceeding $9 trillion by 2010. The growth in the MBS market was
accompanied by numerous innovations such as collateralized mortgage
obligations (CMOs) and the emergence of private label alternatives to MBS
issued by government-sponsored entities”).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Cameron L. Cowan, Hearing on Protecting Homeowners: Preventing
Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit, AM. SECURITIZATION F., at
2
(Nov.
3,
2003),
financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/110503cc.pdf
(explaining the “[p]repayment risk for MBS investors includes the unexpected
return of principal stemming from consumers who refinance the mortgages that
back the securities. Homeowners are more likely to refinance mortgages when
interest rates are falling. As this translates into prepayment of MBS principal,
investors are often forced to reinvest the returned principal at a lower return”).
29. McConnell, supra note 24.
30. See generally Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Transformation of
Mortgage Finance and the Industrial Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown, INST.
RES. LAB. & EMP. (Oct. 2012), www.irle.berkeley.edu/files/2012/TheTransformation-of-Mortgage-Finance-and-the-Industrial-Roots-of-theMortgage-Meltdown.pdf (explaining how it is generally agreed that the cause of
the financial crisis that produced a worldwide recession was the product of a
sudden downturn in the nonconventional mortgage backed securities market in
the U.S; however, there is still debate and less clarity about exactly how this
market developed to produce the crisis).
31. Mike Collins, The Big Bank Bailout, FORBES, (July 14, 2015),
www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/07/14/the-big-bank-
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Federal Reserve took these mortgages off the banks’ hands by
buying $1.75 trillion MBSs directly while the Troubled Asset Relief
Program infused capital into banks.32

D. The Great Recession
Following these events, the country suffered one of the worst
economic downturns in American history.33 This was known as the
Great Recession—sometimes referred to as the 2008 Recession—in
the United States was directly linked to the so-called “subprime
mortgage crisis.”34 Although the Great Recession was officially over
in the United States in 2009, among many people in America and
in other countries around the world, the effects of the downturn
were felt for many more years.35
The Great Recession also ushered in a new period of financial
regulation in the United States and elsewhere.36 Economists have
argued that repeal in the 1990s of the Depression-era regulation
known as the Glass-Steagall Act contributed to the problems that
caused the recession.37 The Glass-Steagall Act was a law that
prevented banks from using depositors' funds for risky investments,
such as the stock market.38 It was also known as the Banking Act
of 1933. The Act gave power to the Federal Reserve to regulate
retail banks.39 The Act also prohibited bank sales of securities, and
created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).40 Most
notably, the Glass-Steagall Act separated investment banking from
retail banking.41 Investment banks organize the initial sales of
stocks, called an Initial Public Offering.42 They facilitate mergers
bailout/#2deb2a242d83.
32. Id.
33. Matt Egan, 2008: Worse than the Great Depression?, CNN MONEY (Aug.
27, 2014), www.money.cnn.com/2014/08/27/news/economy/ben-bernanke-greatdepression/index.html.
34. See generally, Jenny Anderson and Heather Timmons, Why a U.S.
Subprime Mortgage Crisis Is felt Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2007),
www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/business/worldbusiness/31derivatives.html.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally, Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), THE FEDERAL
RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013), www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/
glasssteagallact.
39. Id.
40. See id. (explaining that each bank depositor is insured at least $250,000
per bank).
41. See Glass-Steagall Act (1933), N.Y. TIMES, www.nytimes.com/
topic/subject/glasssteagall-act-1933 (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (explaining the
Glass-Steagall Act was enacted as an emergency response to the failure of
nearly 5,000 banks during the Great Depression and was a part of President
Roosevelt’s New Deal program).
42. See id. (“Investment banking consists mostly of securities underwriting
and related activities; making a market in securities; and setting up corporate
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and acquisitions.43 Many of them operated their own hedge funds.
Retail banks take deposits, manage checking accounts, and make
loans.44

E. The Dodd-Frank Act
In response to the events that led to the Great Recession,
President Barack Obama signed into legislation the Dodd-Frank
Act.45 The Dodd-Frank Act was designed to restore at least some of
the U.S. government’s regulatory power over the financial
industry.46 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, regulations and
government supervision tended to fall on a smaller group of
financial institutions.47 This left a group of nonbank financial
companies and some smaller bank holding companies outside of
government supervision, despite their potential to impact the
financial stability of the United States.48 Dodd-Frank enabled the
federal government to assume control of banks deemed on the brink
of financial collapse. Further, Dodd Frank allowed the
implementation various consumer protections designed to
safeguard investments and prevent “predatory lending,” which is
banks who provide high-interest loans to borrowers who likely will
have difficulty paying.49 Thus, its goal was also geared toward
protecting consumers with Rules such as keeping borrowers from
abusive lending and mortgage practices by banks.50 The bill

mergers, acquisitions, and restructuring. Investment banking also includes
services provided by brokers or dealers in transactions in the secondary
market”).
43. Id.
44. See generally Neil Irwin, What is Glass-Steagall? The 82-Year-Old
Banking Law That Stirred the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015),
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/upshot/what-is-glass-steagall-the-82-year-oldbanking-law-that-stirred-the-debate.html (explaining that when people talk
about banking they are taking about two broad classes of activities:
“Commercial banking is what happens at your neighborhood branch: You
deposit money in a checking or savings account, and the bank uses those
deposits to make loans to consumers or small businesses. Investment banking
refers to the kind of banking activity more common on Wall Street, like helping
large companies issue stock or bonds in order to fund themselves, and trading
securities in hope of making a profit.”)
45. Mark Koba, Dodd-Frank Act: CNBC Explains, CNBC, (May 11, 2012),
www.cnbc.com/id/47075854.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Great Recession, HISTORY, (Dec. 4, 2017), www.history.com/
topics/recession (by economists’ definition, the Great Recession ended in the
middle of 2009 – since then, the unemployment rate has dropped to 7.3 percent,
down from 10 percent in October 2009. Home prices and sales are finally
showing year-over-year gains, and consumer spending in the years following
surpassed the peak recorded in 2008. Still, more than 19 million people remain
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contained sixteen major areas of reform and contained hundreds of
pages.51 This article will focus on the linchpin of the Dodd-Frank
Act, The Volcker Rule.

F. The Volcker Rule
As explained above, because the 2008 economic depression was
largely triggered in part by the real estate bubble bursting, it shined
a light on the mortgage industry.52 The fact of the matter was that
mortgages became extremely easy to obtain, and many of those
mortgages had predatory provisions that made it difficult for
borrowers to pay off the mortgages if their real estate value
decreased.53 The Volcker Rule was enacted to combat this issue and
is part of Dodd-Frank; the Rule prohibits banks from owning,
investing, or sponsoring hedge funds, private equity funds, or any
proprietary trading operations for their own profit.54 The current
Volcker Rule restricts a covered banking entity’s investments in
such proprietary trading.55 Ultimately, The Volcker Rule’s purpose
is to prevent banks from making certain types of speculative
investments that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.56
Five federal agencies, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Commodity Futures

without a job or are underemployed. Many Americans still feel uncomfortable
with their savings, and many largely remain cautious about borrowing money).
51. Id.
52. See When Did the Real Estate Bubble Burst?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 7, 2018),
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/when-did-real-estate-bubbleburst.asp (describing “what caused the real estate bubble was real estate prices
rising steadily in the United States for decades, with slowdowns caused only by
interest rate changes along the way. Prices increased over time as demand for
home ownership through government-sponsored programs increased, along with
the general sentiment that owning real estate represents the American dream.
Mortgages became available to a wider range of consumers with programs offered
by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and others, which may have put money in the hands
of some irresponsible homeowners who would later default on payments”).
53. Id.
54. See James Crotty, Gerald Epstein, & Iren Levina, Proprietary Trading
is a Bigger Deal Than Many Bankers and Pundits Claim, THE HEARTLAND
INST.
(Feb.
18,
2010),
www.heartland.org/publications-resources/
publications/proprietary-trading-is-a-bigger-deal-than-most-bankers-andpundits-claim (explaining that proprietary lending was a big contributor to the
2008 Financial Crisis by stating that “risky proprietary investments by
investment banks, along with trading for clients whose decisions were
influenced by these banks, was one of the main forces that sustained upward
pressure on security prices in the bubble. By 2008, bank trading books held
hundreds of billions of disguised proprietary investments. Also adding for those
who support the Regulations against proprietary lending, the Volcker rule is
just the beginning of more that the government needs to do”).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission,
approved the final regulations that make up the Volcker Rule.57 The
Rules, formally known as section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, went into effect April 1, 2014.
Banks were required to fully comply by July 21, 2015.58
The Rule still allowed banks to continue market making,
underwriting, hedging, trading of government securities, insurance
company activities, offering hedge funds and private equity funds,
and acting as agents, brokers or custodians.59 Therefore, banks may
still continue to offer these services to their customers and generate
profits from providing these services.60 However, banks cannot
engage in these activities if doing so would create a material conflict
of interest, expose the institution to high-risk assets or trading
strategies, or generate instability within the bank or within the
overall U.S. financial system.61 Additionally, depending on their
size, banks must meet varying levels of reporting requirements to
disclose details of their covered trading activities to the
government.62 Thus, larger institutions were required to implement
a program to ensure compliance with the new rules, and their
programs were subjected to independent testing and analysis, and
smaller institutions were subject to lesser compliance and reporting
requirements.63
Despite these regulations, the Volcker Rule has been criticized
on many levels.64 The Rule is said to be too costly on banks and have
negative consequences on the economy, and that its costs outweigh
the benefits.65 The Rule has also been criticized on the grounds that
57. Id.
58. See Volcker Rule, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/v/volckerrule.asp.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See generally Francine McKenna, Biggest Banks Prefer Full Volcker
Repeal, But a Rewrite Would Do, MARKET WATCH, (Aug. 19, 2017),
www.marketwatch.com/story/biggest-banks-prefer-full-volcker-rule-repealbut-a-rewrite-would-do-2017-08-11 (stating the Volcker Rule is supposed to
limit risk-taking by banks by prohibiting proprietary trading, or trading for a
bank’s own account, as a way to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally id. (explaining “Dodd-Frank’s false premise is that an
alchemy of Wall Street greed, outsized private risk and massive Washington deregulation almost blew up the world economy. According to their narrative, this
necessitated massive taxpayer bailouts and a functional occupation of our
capital markets by federal regulators. But financial regulation did not decrease
in the decade leading up to the crisis – it markedly increased. In fact, regulatory
restrictions on financial services grew every year between 1999 and 2008.
Financial services was, and remains, one of the heaviest regulated industries in
the economy”).
65. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Volcker Rule and the Cost of Good
Intentions, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 13, 2012), www.dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/02/13/the-volcker-rule-and-the-costs-of-good-intentions/ (stating that an
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it makes American banks less competitive in the global spectrum
against international banks that do not have such restrictions.
66Moreover, the Rule is said to be too complicated, misunderstood,
and invites too many loopholes leaving the investors and consumers
it was intended to protect, without adequate protection.67

G. The Financial Choice Act 2018
After six years with the Volcker Rule in place, President
Obama’s term came to an end. During the 2017 presidential
elections, Republican nominee Donald J. Trump, was elected to be
President Obama’s successor in the oval office.68 After President
Trump was inaugurated, he and members of Congress made several
efforts to gut key portions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which would
remove among other rules protecting Americans from another
recession, the Volcker Rule.69
President Trump, proposed the House of Representative Bill
10 (“HR-10”), and known as the Financial Choice Act of 2017.70 This
bill would largely tweaked the Dodd-Frank Act, and completely the
Volcker Rule.71 Despite an unexpected bipartisan vote to pass the
bill, the United States Senate, passed a bill on March, 7, 2018, with
a 67 to 32 vote, that was a version of HR-10.72 The primary motive
industry study estimated that the Volcker Rule could cost companies and
investors more than $350 billion, but that projection, which has been criticized
by some economists, could be wildly exaggerated).
66. Id. On this point, Mr. Volcker himself, rebutted critics who say that the
Volcker Rule is going to make the United States banking business less
competitive with foreign rivals who don’t have such restrictions. Mr. Volcker
calls such criticism “superficial,” saying: “Competition in banking, here as
elsewhere, is desirable for the benefits it brings in institutional efficiency and
better, more economical service to customers. Any contribution of proprietary
trading to customer service and competition is not at all obvious. In fact,
because of the risks, the conflicts of interest and the adverse cultural influence
it may well impede effective competition.”
67. Id.
68. See generally, Anthony Zurcher, Donald Trump and Barak Obama Meet
at the White House, BBC (Nov. 10, 2016), www.bbc.com/news/election-us-201637932231 (detailing the 90 minute meeting President Trump and former
President Obama had in the oval office after President Trumps win)
69. See Ben Protess and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back
Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 3, 2017),
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financialregulations.html (quoting President Trump as saying “[w]e expect to be cutting
a lot out of Dodd-Frank, because frankly, I have so many people, friends of mine
that had nice businesses, they can’t borrow money,” “They just can’t get any
money because the banks just won’t let them borrow it because of the rules and
regulations in Dodd-Frank”).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Evan Sparks, Senate Takes Key Procedural Step on Reg Reform
Bill, ABA BANKING J., (last visited Mar. 6, 2018),
bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/03/senate-takes-key-procedural-step-on-reg-
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of the Financial Choice Act is to reduce the regulatory burden on
our banks and on our economy.73

H. Regulatory Spending
As stated above, the Financial Choice Act (H.R. 10) would
amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and other laws governing
regulation of the financial industry.74 It would make numerous
changes to the authorities of the agencies that regulate the financial
industry, and it would change how the operations of the National
Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) and Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) are funded.75
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) estimates that
enacting the legislation would reduce federal deficits by “$24.1
billion over the 2017-2027 period.76 Additionally, direct spending
would be reduced by $30.1 billion, and revenues would be reduced
by $5.9 billion.” Most of the budgetary savings would come from
eliminating the OLF and changing how the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau is funded.77 Moreover, the CBO also estimates
that, over the 2017-2027 period, and assuming appropriation of the
necessary amounts, implementing the bill would cost $1.8 billion.78
Finally, CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not
increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $5
billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning
in 2028.79
Accordingly, the Financial Choice Act has some possible
regulatory savings.80 Yet, it removes some of the key protections
and that the Dodd Frank Act provides in the area of predatory
lending.81 However, it is unknown whether costs and benefits of the
heavy regulations with the Dodd-Frank Act and the curt
reform-bill/ (stating that all Republicans and 12 Democrats voted to pass the
bill).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Norbert Michel, Budget Reconciliation: A Viable Path for CHOICE Act
Reforms, FORBES (Sep. 4, 2017), www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/
2017/09/04/budget-reconciliation-a-viable-path-for-choice-actreforms/#b6a0088496f0.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See generally AMERICA’S DEBT HELP ORGANIZATION, www.debt.org/
credit/predatory-lending/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017) (explaining that “by
definition, predatory lending benefits the lender and ignores or hinders the
borrower’s ability to repay the debt. These lending tactics often try to take
advantage of a borrower’s lack of understanding about loans, terms or
finances”).
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regulations of the Financial Choice Act are even truly effective.82
III. ANALYSIS
The Analysis section of this paper will examine the pros and
cons of the highly-debated Volcker Rule. This section will also
highlight the veracity of proprietary lending, and finally, it will
weed through the scenarios of what abolishment and
accomplishments a repeal of the Volcker Rule would result in. This
will be done to provide a greater insight into whether our financial
sector truly needs such extensive and complicated regulations.
Thereafter, it will describe the results the Financial Choice Act is
projected to accomplish.

A. The Volcker Rule and Related Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act
First, in addition to the Volcker Rule, Dodd-Frank also
implemented the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act.83 It is necessary to explore this Act to understand the
significance of the Volcker Rule in connection with risky lending
that led to millions of people defaulting on their mortgages. Under
this Act, lending institutions provide standards for the level of
disclosure required for borrowers so that individuals getting a
mortgage can be aware of the obligations and the risks.84 Thus,
lenders are required to have more transparency and exercise
caution when dealing with borrowers’ funds.85 This provision, in
conjunction with the Volcker Rule, makes trading such MBSs less
risky.86
On the other hand, “President Trump supports dismantling
Dodd-Frank for the simple reason that banks aren’t lending money
to people who need it.”87 However, is it not what proceeded the
economic crisis the practice of lending money to people that may have

82. See generally Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd-Frank Banking
Rule Passes in House, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/
06/08/business/dealbook/house-financial-regulations-dodd-frank.html
(explaining bill’s passage in the House, by 233 to 186, keeps alive the
Republican Party’s dream of unwinding one of President Barack Obama’s
signature accomplishments).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Jim Puzzanghera, Trump Says Businesses Can’t Borrow Because of
Dodd-Frank, the Numbers Tell Another Story, L.A. TIMES, (Feb. 26, 2017),
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-bank-loans-20170226-story.html
(Stating a “main reason for dismantling Dodd-Frank often cited by Trump and
critics of the law that its slew of tougher financial regulations have significantly
restricted bank lending isn't borne out by the data”).
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needed it, but that could not repay it?88 Yet, does the Volcker Rule
accomplish what is had set out to and should Americans worry about
its abolishment.89 It could be without these all these limitations in
place, some question if in an event of another financial crisis,
enough protections will be in place so that history does not repeat
itself.90
Moreover, Title XIV also establishes minimum standards for
all mortgage products. Creditors may not make a home mortgage
loan unless “they reasonably determine that the borrower can repay
the loan based on the borrower’s credit history, current income,
expected income and other factors.”91 However, for certain types of
mortgages enumerated in this Title there are presumptions of
ability to repay.92 Most importantly, there “must be additional
disclosures given to any borrowers for home mortgages, both at the
time that the mortgage is made, as well as in the monthly loan
statements.”93 This is a necessary check in the system to curtail
predatory lending and protect home owners.94
As previously explained, predatory lending involves
unprincipled actions carried out by a lender to entice a borrower in
taking a mortgage that carries unfavorable terms.95 For example,
some of these terms high fees, a high interest rate, strips the
borrower of equity or places the borrower in a lower credit rated
loan to the benefit of the lender.96 Also, of these high cost mortgages
that the title’s disclosures apply to include first mortgages with an
interest rate that is more than 6.5% higher than the average prime

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (Dodd-Frank Act § 1411) (2010).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See 5 Examples of Predatory Lending, MORTGAGE 101,
www.mortgage101.com/article/5-examples-predatory-lending (explaining
“one of the most common tactics that is used by predatory lenders is
emphasizing the monthly payment instead of the other factors of the loan.
Another common predatory lending practice is the use of balloon loans.
Balloon loans provide borrowers with a small monthly payment for the
majority of the loan. Another predatory lending practice is referred to as
packing. This is when the lender packs extra things in with the loan without
your knowledge. Also, sometimes lenders will charge excessive points and
fees on their loans in an attempt to bring in some more profit. One point is
typically equal to one percent of the loan balance. And finally, some
individuals choose to work with a mortgage broker in order to find the best
deal on a mortgage. There is nothing wrong with using a mortgage broker
as they can sometimes be very beneficial. However, in some cases lenders
will make an excessive payment to these mortgage brokers. This is done so
that the mortgage broker will be influenced to bring customers to the lender.
This is a disservice to the customers of the mortgage broker”).
96. Id.
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offer rate.97 They also apply to a second mortgage with an interest
rate more than 8.5% higher than the average prime offer rate.98
Thus, Title XIV is another step the Dodd-Frank Act took to tackle
the issues that led to the financial crisis and it works in conjunction
the Volcker Rule’s objective as well.
Getting back to the Volcker Rule, it was essentially designed
to prevent large banks from becoming “too big to fail”.99 The term
“too big to fail” refers to when the failure of a bank would distress
the economy, and a too-big-to-fail bank will likely need to be bailed
out with Americans’ taxpayer funds.100 In this respect, the Rule
sought to undo damage when Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall
Act, which mitigated the risks associated with banking by breaking
up the banking activities into two separate types of banks.101 This
is why the Volcker Rule is best understood as an attempt to update
the New Deal–era Glass-Steagall for the twenty-first century.102
“Glass-Steagall called for a complete separation of investment
banking—the activities of underwriting and dealing with stocks
and debt—from deposit taking. Consistently weakened from the
1980s onward, Glass-Steagall was fully repealed in the late 1990s
to allow Citicorp to merge with an insurance company.”103
It is, however, debated whether the Rule truly accomplishes
this, and if it is worth the costs associated with it. For example,
according to Standard & Poor, Banks could lose $10 billion in profit
due to the Volcker Rule, and it should also be taken into account the
money spent by our government to implement and monitor these

97. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, What is a “Higher-priced
Mortgage, (Sept. 13, 2017), www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-ahigher-priced-mortgage-loan-en-1797/.
98. Id.
99. See Rachel Witkowski, Volcker Rule “Too Big to Fail” Set For Changes,
WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2017), www.wsj.com/articles/mnuchin-volcker-rule-toobig-to-fail-set-for-changes-1501187844 (stating the “Volcker rule, part of the
2010 Dodd-Frank financial-overhaul law, prevents banks from trading for their
own account and seeks to make them only facilitate their clients’ trading
activities and bank executives complain that the line separating the two is
fuzzy”).
100. What is “too big to fail”?, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/
t/too-big-to-fail.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
102. The Banking Act of 1933, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY
www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass_steagall_act (last visited Apr 9,
2018). “The Glass-Steagall Act gave tighter regulation of national banks to
the Federal Reserve System, requiring holding companies and other
affiliates of state member banks to make three reports annually to their
Federal Reserve Bank and to the Federal Reserve Board. Furthermore,
bank holding companies that owned a majority of shares of any Federal
Reserve member bank had to register with the Fed and obtain its permit to
vote their shares in the selection of directors of any such member-bank
subsidiary.” Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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complex regulations.104 A deeper look into the Volcker Rule
warrants the quandary of whether the Rule is truly beneficial.
Additionally, it has been debated whether banning these
activities made the financial crisis worse; one estimate has held
that “the major Wall Street firms suffering $230 billion dollars in
prop trading losses a year into the crisis.”105 Recently these
activities are subsidized by access to the banking safety net.106
Thus, within a day or two of the Volcker Rule announcement, “the
press was full of stories quoting data from bank analysts that
proprietary trading was very small.”107 And thus, the banks and
economy were losing money.108 But, “if one looks at the ratio or
trading income as a share of net revenue while it was 5.1 % in the
year of the crash, it was more than 45% at the height of the boom
in 2006”.109 The widely-cited estimates are almost certainly trying
to estimate proprietary trading in the “narrowest way possible” and
likely do not take into account the capricious lines that are drawn
between many different factors that part in these types of
trading.110 Yet, putting so much emphasis on one banking activity
does not automatically provide the entire American community
with umbrella protection. What we need, and moreover deserve, is
transparency from the system.
Currently, the Volcker Rule seeks to keep activities essential
to banking within a safety net, while excluding other, riskier,
activities from this safety net.111 There are a variety of distinctive
regulations, and safeguards banks get, ranging from federal deposit
insurance (known as FDIC) to access to the Federal Reserve’s
discount borrowing window.112 These implementations are
principally designed to keep the system functioning in an event like
the financial crisis.113 However, there are just as many, if not more,

104. See Michael Moore and Dakin Campbell, Wall Street Sweats Out
Volcker Rule Impact of Revenue, BLOOMBERG, (Dec. 3, 2013),
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-04/wall-street-sweats-out-volckerrule-with-18-of-revenue-in-play (stating “Wall Street banks, which already shut
proprietary trading units that helped fuel record profits, are girding to learn
next week how much revenue the Volcker rule may cut from the $44 billion they
say comes from market-making”).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. James Crotty, The Real Price of Proprietary Trading, HUFF. POST (Apr.
25, 2011) www.huffingtonpost.com/gerald-epstein/the-real-price-of-proprie_b_
472857.html.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Neil Irwin, Everything You Need to Know About the Volcker Rule,
WASH. POST, (Dec. 10, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2013/12/10/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-volckerrule/?utm_term=.58dd5457e0e7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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loopholes than protections embedded in the Rule.114
Even the collation to be divest of the Volcker Rule received
support from an unlikely source, The Federal Reserve.115 The
Federal Reserve is the chief regulator of the big banks. Federal
Reserve Governor, Jerome Powell, who leads banking regulation for
the central bank told the Senate Banking Committee, “[w]e believe
we have the authority to draw a line between those with the big
trading books (and other banks).”116 The argument that is being
suggested is that we could have a system that regulated large bank
group regulated one way and have everyone else regulated less.117
Some of the arguments currently being made were made back when
the Volcker Rule was enacted; this is due to the fact that the Rule
is regarded as complicated legislation that does not take into
account the different degrees of activities conducted by different
sized banks.118
Yet, beyond all of this, one main and reoccurring argument for
being rid of the Rule is the big increase in banking regulation since
the crisis has made compliance difficult and expensive.119 This has
had the effect of giving a competitive advantage to the biggest
banks, which can spread the cost over huge operations.120 The
perplexing irony of it all is, that the true effects the Volcker Rule
will not be known until it is tested against another financial
crisis.121

B. The Financial Choice Act
Conversely, as stated in the bill proposed by the Trump
administration, the true goal of the Financial Choice Act (“Choice
Act”) is to eliminate the abuse of large scale investing with large
consumer funds by breaking up the enormous entities that control
the financial sector.122 Thus, the bill states that by limiting the
capacity of these large-scale entities, it could potentially lead to
more free flow of funds and economic prosperity with less of a
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally Hall Scoot and Lisa Donner, Should the US Ease
Regulations on Big Banks?, FIN. TIMES, www.ft.com/content/ac28eadc-1bc711e8-956a-43db76e69936 (last visited Nov. 1, 2018) (stating in contrast to The
United States, “the Bank of England allows lenders to model their own losses
and then compares the models with each other and with its own version. If
differences are reasonable they are permitted. This helps avoid “model
monoculture” in which every bank adapts its holdings in order to pass the tests
and they all end up holding assets the government model favors. A diversity of
bank strategies is far preferable given that risks are hard to predict”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Irwin, supra note 111.
122. ABA BANKING J., supra note 72.
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chance of the economy sinking as a whole.123 Also, according to the
American Action Forum, “the Choice Act could eliminate $10 billion
in annual regulatory costs and save 10.3 million hours of
paperwork.”124 Thus, an attempt to not completely deregulate, but
more so regulate correctly, seems to be the purported goal of the
Choice Act.125
For example, on June 7, 2016, the House Financial Services
Committee Chairman, Jeb Hensarling, a republican from Texas,
unveiled details of the Financial Choice Act.126 At this unveiling,
Chairman Hensarling explained that the terms Choice stands for
Creating Hope and Opportunity for Investors, Consumers and
Entrepreneurs. He further went on to explain that the Choice Act
is being introduced because it was not “de-regulation that caused
the financial crisis; it was dumb regulation.”127
Additionally, some critics of the Volcker Rule state that is may
have been due to “a panic during the financial crisis”.128 The “panic”
theory revolves around the basis that during the financial crisis,
regulators, and the market panicked over not knowing how banks'
proprietary trading and the extent of potential losses might affect
the financial system.129 Thus, leading to a raw and misguided
legislation.130 Its critics further say that, depending on how
regulators implement the provision, the Volcker Rule could actually
harm a bank or its customer’s ability to manage its assets. 131 It is
also, important to mention that the Rule cuts into profits and

123. Id.
124. See Sam Batkins, CHOICE Act Equal At Least $10 Billion in
Deregulation,
AMERICAN
ACTION
FORUM
(June
6,
2017),
www.americanactionforum.org/insight/choice-acts-equals-least-10-billionderegulation/ (stating that the Volcker Rule costs $4,300,000,000 annually).
125. Id.
126. See Remarks Of Jeb Herseling on the Plan To Replace Dodd
Frank, THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE, www.financialservices.house.gov/
news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400730 (last visited Oct. 27,
2017), (explaining “Dodd-Frank’s false premise is that an alchemy of Wall
Street greed, outsized private risk and massive Washington de-regulation
almost blew up the world economy. According to their narrative, this
necessitated massive taxpayer bailouts and a functional occupation of our
capital markets by federal regulators. But financial regulation did not
decrease in the decade leading up to the crisis – it markedly increased. In
fact, regulatory restrictions on financial services grew every year between
1999 and 2008. Financial services was, and remains, one of the heaviest
regulated industries in the economy”).
127. Id.
128. See Katherine Reynolds Lewis, The 5 Best and 5 Worst Regulations in
Dodd-Frank, THE FISCAL TIMES, www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/07/19/
The-5-Best-and-5-Worst-Regulations-in-Dodd-Frank (last visited Oct. 25, 2017)
(explaining it proper regulation should depend on the quality of the regulations
not the quantity).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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growth which is vital to economic development.132 Thus, under this
theory, the Volcker Rule created the effect of pulling the trigger fast,
instead of providing a real solution to the issues at hand.
Before Dodd-Frank was passed, former Senator Chris Dodd, a
democrat from Connecticut, stated that there is some Dodd Frank
legislation that no one will know if they worked until the effects are
measured against an economic meltdown.133 The Volcker Rule is a
clear example of this. To put it simply, the only effect banning of
proprietary trading by banks that has manifested tangibly is that it
hurts the amount of capital available in the market.134 Many
economists agree that this effect reduces the ability of banks to
resist shocks in the market and causes them to freeze up, which
could lead to another possible banking crisis.135 The Volcker Rule
itself was said to be implemented for a number of issues that the
Choice Act now aims to resolve along with other possible crises that
we are sure to face.136 As such, it remains questionable whether the
Choice Act provides the answer to age old dilemmas without the
costly regulations.
At the core of the new bill is an exemption of about two dozen
financial companies with assets between “$50 billion and
$250 billion from the highest levels of scrutiny by the Federal
Reserve,” which, mentioned above, is the nation’s central bank.137
Additionally, supporters of the Choice Act argue that the legislation
would bring much-needed relief to midsize and regional banks that
were treated like their much larger counterparts under DoddFrank.138 However, opponents of the bill argue that it would weaken
the oversight needed to ward off the type of dangerous lending and
investing that brought the U.S. economy to its worst financial state
since WWII. One major opponent of the Choice Act was a principal
figure behind Dodd-Frank. Senator Elizabeth Warren, a democrat
from Massachusetts, vigorously argued against the bill and stated
that “[o]n the 10th anniversary of an enormous financial crash,
Congress should not be passing laws to roll back regulations on Wall
Street banks.”139 She further lamented that the bill permits about
132. Id.
133. See Erica Werner and Damian Paletta, 10 Years After Financial Crisis,
WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/10years-after-financial-crisis-senate-prepares-to-roll-back-bankingrules/2018/03/04/e6115438-1e37-11e8-9de1147dd2df3829_story.html?utm_term=.88024e1bbab3 (elaborating “that a Wall
Street regulatory rollback is possible is a testament to the financial sector’s
improved standing on Capitol Hill — as well as to the lobbying muscle of local
banks and credit unions present in every state”).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Morris Pearl, Remember the Lehman Brothers Crisis: We need Wall
Street Rules, Not Trump Deregulation, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2018),
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25 of the 40 largest banks in America to escape heightened scrutiny
and “to be regulated as if they were tiny little community banks
that could have no impact on the economy.”140 However, it is evident
that no matter which way you fall on the side of the debate, there
are principal issues being left out of the conversation.

IV. PROPOSAL
Regardless of the on-going debate, between regulations and
deregulations, it is inevitable that we will face another financial
crisis. Therefore, at its core the Volcker rule and other regulations
that were passed by the Obama Administration were not in effect
to prevent another financial crisis, but in fact were an attempt to
stabilize and better prepare our financial sector to tackle another
crisis.141 Again, in theory, this would possibly prevent massive
bailouts for those banks and banks that are “too big to fail,” and
lessen the enormous burden that taxpayers were forced to endure
as a result of such bailouts. However, the key component to the “too
big to fail” concept has yet to be addressed by any regulation or
administration.

A. The Volcker Rule Does Not Deal With “The Too
Big to Fail” Issue
Without a deeper understanding of what the Volcker rule truly
accomplished, one may presume that the issue of “too big to fail”
that was touted around for years during and after the 2008 crisis
was in fact dealt with. However, in essence the problem still
remains a nebulous issue. The Volcker rule only “split up” big
banking activities and required greater scrutiny for risky
investments. 142 “The intention behind this was clearly not to
eliminate the too big to fail problem but ensure that large firms do
not pose systemic risk like they did in 2008.”143
As previously explained, the Volcker Rule restricts the ways
big banks invest by regulating their trading in risky transactions.
In other words, the rule prohibits “banking entities” to invest
customer deposits in speculative investments through “proprietary
trading”.144 But proprietary trading was not the sole root cause for
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2018/09/14/trump-republicansinviting-new-wall-street-crash-lehman-anniversary-column/1292862002/.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See THE MARKET MOGUL, www.themarketmogul.com/can-dodd-frankact-tackle-big-fail-issue/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (stating “the too big to fail”
problem continues to exist with megabanks continuing to threaten the future
economy).
143. Id.
144. See id. (explaining that “on July 22nd 2011 the United States Court of
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the 2008 financial crisis; therefore, introducing the Volcker rule
may have been a futile attempt to address a problem that never
existed.145
Another factor to consider is that the Volcker rule costs banks
hundreds of millions of dollars.146 Much of this money will be passed
onto the end consumer as costs for banking at these institutions,
and moreover, the benefits of these regulations have no tangible
benefits that may be seen until another financial crisis hits, and an
analysis can be drawn of how the regulations hold up in contrast to
the effects of the pre and post regulations. All this does is leave the
American consumer left with speculation and uncertainty.
These regulations adequately seek to provide enough
protection that is warranted to the American people. Nor do these
regulations justify the impositions put on banks. What the
regulations really can be boiled down to are experiments that the
government is using the American people and banks as guinea pigs
to conduct.

B. What We Need
Post 2008, the US banks have not only become ‘healthier and
stronger’ but also “bigger and more interconnected.”147 What we
truly need is a solution that underpins the way banks operate and
grow and not just a way that they conduct business and make
money. “Former president Obama has strongly endorsed the
Volcker Rule, claiming, the Volcker Rule will make it illegal for
firms to use government-insured money to make speculative bets
that threaten the entire financial system, and demand a new era of
accountability from CEOs who must sign off on their firm's
practices.”148 However, the Volcker rule only dealt with a few of the
risky activities, such as proprietary lending. Moreover, the rule in
fact did nothing to battle the infrastructure of big banks that caused
such a widespread financial crisis which devastated millions and
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a challenge by two trade groups to
a Dodd-Frank-related rule on shareholder voting put forward by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC); the court found that the rule was backed by
insufficient or faulty economic analysis of costs and benefits. On December 2nd,
another case on similar grounds was filed in a Washington, DC, district court
by two securities-industry trade groups, this time against the CFTC, concerning
restrictions on derivative holdings. If that court, too, finds for the plaintiffs
expect a deluge of further suits”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See generally, John Aziz, THE WEEK, theweek.com/articles/454633/
why-volcker-rule-wont-solve-problem-big-fail (last visited Nov. 22, 2017)
(explaining that “[t]he idea is to have a two-tier banking sector: A non-risktaking part, which accepts retail deposits and benefits from deposit insurance,
and a risk-taking-part, which does not accept retail deposits and does not
benefit from deposit insurance.”).
148. Id.
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caused such a massive government bailout.149 While this sounds
like a plan and did put understandably angry Americans a bit at
ease, it was no more than an illusion of accountability and
redressability. This is true because in order to truly monitor big
banking activity, and not only attempt to prepare but protect
against another financial crisis, big banks must be broken up.

C. The Solution
Proponents of regulation always debate about how to hold big
financial institutions accountable. However, the concept will always
remain an illusion. This is because, in the triangle, created by
regulation between the banks, the consumer, and the government
regulation, never addresses the crucial fact that in the end, the
transactions that lead to liability occur between only the consumer
and the bank. While it is certain that a standard must be
established by governments on how banks should operate, this is
only one minor piece of the puzzle. To protect the consumer and the
financial industry, large banking operations must be broken up into
sectors. Therefore, the answer is neither the Financial Choice Act
nor Volcker Rule, and I would propose that a version similar to the
Glass Segal Act be brought back and replace the Volcker rule.
This solution can be distinguished from the rest because of its
premise of transparency. The foundation of the current regulation
was never based on proper footing and analysis, but I believe the
Glass Segal Act was. In order to truly protect the American
consumer from big banking activity, it is first and foremost
important that the American consumer be aware with what they
are dealing with. The Glass–Steagall legislation described four
provisions of the U.S. Banking Act of 1933 separating commercial
and investment banking.150 This Act was prematurely and
wrongfully repealed.151 I believe that this Act had the right idea to
combat the copious activities of banks that have led to more than
one financial crisis. The tiered/segmented approach to banking is
the missing link in the quest for a solution to the too big to fail issue
and the answer to the quest to provide a solution to protect the
American people.152 Therefore, this solution would not only combat
the underlying issue of banks being too big to fail by breaking them
up into sectors, it would also provide transparency into the banking
industry. Furthermore, it would make the task of regulation more
149. See id. (explaining “the Volcker Rule attempted to update this
separation for the 21st century by restricting the speculative activities of all
Federally insured banks, but without any explicit separation between retail and
investment sectors”).
150. What Was The Glass-Steagall Act?, INVESTOPEDIA, investopedia.com/
articles/03/071603.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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simple and a lot less costly because regulators would be able to
discern which type of bank and its banking activities requires what
type of specific and targeted regulation. Currently, this is not the
case because we are dealing with a myriad of regulations that
overhaul the underlying issue which not only are too complicated
and costly, but also too speculative when assessed against the big
picture issue.153
Therefore, first I would propose that the provision of the Glass
Segal Act that separated commercial and retail banking be
reenacted. This will for one allow the government more easily
implement and monitor regulations that are tailored to a specific
type of banking and its consumer. Also, this will provide the
consumer with the added protection of what kind of transaction
they are being subjected to. Additionally, with this added layer of
awareness, a consumer may be better equipped to know and
understand the risks involved and make a more educated decision.
Breaking banking into two different sectors will lift some fog from
the elusive banking industry.
Moreover, I would implement an additional responsibility on
banks to know their consumer’s risk level. Are they risk adverse or
can they cushion a higher level of risks? These types of evaluations
are made and required by broker under the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, and I do not see why they should not apply to banks
that are making investments with their consumers’ funds as well.154
Some may argue that that the two operations differ fundamentally.
Yet, in the end the concept of the two is the same. Making money
out of money.
Thus, requiring banks to have a higher reserve is only one step
in a two-step process that I would impose on banks to not gamble
(so to speak) with consumers’ funds that are highly risk adverse.
Just as a calculated and well-informed investment decisions are
imposed on brokers, banks should nonetheless be required to abide
by the same principals. Furthermore, since a bank makes its money
by investing and trading with other people’s money, I would have
all banks “share the wealth” by remitting a much higher interest
rate on all types of saving accounts held by consumers.
And finally, I would eliminate any nonfunctional exceptions to
these regulations. Moreover, the only functional exceptions I can
think of is allowing any sort of risky investment by banks only via
a waiver by the consumer. However, this waiver would not be easily
obtained by banks. To the contrary, a high threshold of showing that
the consumer was cognizant of any and all risks and still
independently choose to accept them would be necessary for such a
153. Id.
154. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seact1934.asp, (last visited
Apr. 7, 2018).
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waiver. I would allow this only exception because largely banking is
a contract between two parties and there should remain flexibility
to choose individual rights.

